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THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CRIMINAL JURY SELECTION
Brittany L. Deitch*
The criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial is enshrined within the U.S.
Constitution as a protection for the defendant against arbitrary and harsh convictions
and punishments. The jury trial has been praised throughout U.S. history for allow-
ing the community to democratically participate in the criminal justice system and
for insulating criminal defendants from government oppression. This Article asks
whether the jury selection process is consistent with the defendant-protection
justification for the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Currently, the prosecu-
tion and defense share equal control over jury selection. Looking to the literal text
of the Sixth Amendment, the landmark case on the right to a jury trial, and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for guidance, this Article explains that jury
selection procedures undermine the defendant-protection rationale for the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. Because the Sixth Amendment grants this right
personally to the defendant and the Supreme Court has construed this right as
intending to protect the defendant from governmental overreach, the prosecution
should not be entitled to select the very jury that is supposed to serve as a check
against its power. After concluding that symmetrical power in jury selection under-
mines the constitutional purpose of the jury trial, this Article proposes two possible
remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet imagined by
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution.1
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a trial by an impartial jury to
those criminally accused.2 As with every provision in the Bill of Rights, the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial serves to protect the individual from the govern-
ment.3 This right is among those that the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental
and incorporated to the states.4 It constitutes an especially important barrier between
the government and the individual, because it grants members of the community the
authority to participate as a check and balance against governmental prosecution of
another member of the community.5 The importance of the jury trial right in crimi-
nal cases is especially evident when contrasted with the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial in civil cases.6 The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has not
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 3 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 69, 71 (H. A. Washington ed., 1853) [hereinafter Jefferson Letter to
Thomas Paine].
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . .”). Article III of the Constitution establishes the criminal jury trial,
but does not confer a right to a jury trial and is thus outside the scope of this Article. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury . . . .”).
3 See Address at the National Archives Dedicating the New Shrine for the Declaration
of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, 1952–53 PUB. PAPERS 347
(Dec. 15, 1952) (“[The Bill of Rights is] the only document in the world that protects the
citizen against his Government.”); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)
(“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the
Government.”).
4 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154 (“[T]he right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a
fundamental right and hence must be recognized by the States as part of their obligation to
extend due process of law to all persons within their jurisdiction.”).
5 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“The purpose of a jury is to guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of
the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference
to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge. . . . Community
participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with
our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal
justice system.” (citation omitted)).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
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been incorporated to the states.7 More tellingly, a jury trial is the default in serious crim-
inal cases;8 by contrast, a party in a civil case must affirmatively request a jury trial.9
Despite the clear importance of the criminal jury trial, two disturbing trends
have emerged in criminal adjudications. First, criminal defendants waive this right in
the vast majority of criminal cases.10 By resolving their cases through plea bargain-
ing, criminal defendants willingly submit themselves to the government and forgo
the opportunity to allow their peers to participate in the adjudication.11 Second, of the
cases that go to trial, defendants are counterintuitively more likely to be convicted
in a jury trial than in a bench trial.12 The comparative infrequency of the jury trial and
of acquittals in those atypical cases presented before juries contradicts the Founders’
vision of juries as a vital protection for the defendant against the government. The
aim of this Article is not to explain this inconsistency, but instead is to expose a
conflict between the Founders’ intentions and the practical reality of the jury trial
in criminal cases. This Article contends that jury selection procedures, which grant
the prosecution equal control with the defendant, undermine the defendant-protec-
tion rationale of the Sixth Amendment. Resolution of this problem has the potential
to resolve the waiver and conviction issues by encouraging the defendant to assert
his Sixth Amendment right and by reducing the jury conviction rate.
Although jury trials in criminal cases are the exception, jury selection procedures
have given rise to many constitutional claims.13 Presently, these procedures grant
7 See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 5 (2017) (explaining that the right to a trial by jury in federal
courts under the Seventh Amendment has not been extended to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment); Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Deconstructing Juryless Fact-Finding in Civil
Cases, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235, 275 (2016) (“Unlike the Sixth Amendment Criminal
Jury Trial Clause, the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury Trial Clause has not been deemed funda-
mental or applicable against the states.”).
8 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (“If the defendant is entitled to
a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless: (1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing;
(2) the government consents; and (3) the court approves.”).
9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) (describing the procedures for demanding a jury trial); FED.
R. CIV. P. 38(d) (“A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed.”).
10 See Criminal Cases, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases
/criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/2Y8U-479S] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (“More than 90
percent of defendants plead guilty rather than go to trial.”).
11 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748–49, 756 (1970) (adopting a standard the
Court will apply to determine whether a plea was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intel-
ligently); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (requiring that guilty pleas be knowing
and voluntary because they waive constitutional rights, including the Sixth Amendment right
to a trial by jury).
12 See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 151, 152 (2005) (discussing possible reasons for the “conviction gap” between bench
and jury trials, where over a fourteen-year period, the jury trial conviction rate for federal
criminal defendants was 84% and the bench trial conviction rate was 55%).
13 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–46 (1994) (prohibiting use
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defendants and prosecution equal control over jury selection.14 Each side is entitled
to unlimited for-cause challenges, which allow them to strike prospective jurors who
demonstrate bias or partiality,15 and a limited number of peremptory challenges, which
allow the parties to exclude prospective jurors for any reason or no reason.16 Perhaps
the most extensively debated aspect of jury selection is the discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges.17 However, focus on the Equal Protection rights of the prospec-
tive jurors overlooks the core problem with jury selection procedures because it deflects
the attention from the person whom the jury is designed to protect: the defendant.
This Article submits that the more fundamental constitutional issue with pro-
secutorial peremptory challenges, and with jury selection more broadly, is that allowing
prosecutors to participate equally in jury selection undermines the rationale for the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury. Curing this problem requires revision
of United States jury selection procedures with the language and purpose of the
Sixth Amendment in mind. The right to a jury trial belongs exclusively to the
criminal defendant,18 and its purpose is to protect the defendant from governmental
of peremptory challenges on the basis of sex); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44, 59
(1992) (holding that criminal defendants may not use peremptory challenges discriminatorily
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 631 (1991) (expanding Batson to civil cases); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95–100
(1986) (holding that prosecutors may not use peremptory challenges to exclude prospective
jurors solely on the basis of race); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537–38 (1975) (holding
that women, as a class, may not be excluded from the venire, or jury pool); United States v.
Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1229 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that prospective jurors may not be
dismissed solely based on their membership in an organization).
14 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (giving both the defense and prosecution the same amount
of peremptory challenges).
15 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (“[C]hallenges for cause permit rejection
of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality . . . .”);
see also 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 385 (4th
ed. 2017) (“A party has no right to an unlimited number of peremptory challenges, unlike
challenges for cause. The number allowed can be and is controlled by statute or, in federal
criminal cases, by rule, and there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges.” (foot-
notes omitted)).
16 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (“The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that
it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court’s control.”); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 385.
17 See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810 (1997) (discussing the debate on peremptory
challenges and arguing that “the benefits of the peremptory challenge system are outweighed
by the damage which that system causes to the most basic principles of an impartial jury”).
18 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“A right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.”); see also Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975) (“The Sixth Amendment . . . grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense. . . . The right to defend is given directly to the
accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”).
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overreach.19 Allowing the prosecution to actively participate in selecting the jury
infringes on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Simply stated, the government
should not be entitled to select the very jury that is supposed to serve as a check against
its power. Restoring the integrity of the defendant’s right to a jury trial requires more
than just increasing the prevalence of the jury trial or prohibiting discrimination.
Jury selection procedures must give defendants greater control of their rights. This
Article proposes two possible selection processes that limit the prosecution to a
more passive role. Effectuating any change designed to grant the defendant more
control over selecting his jury would not only better reflect American constitutional
history and values, but also may result in more criminal defendants electing to “enjoy”20
their right to a jury trial.
This Article progresses in three parts. Part I provides a background on jury selec-
tion in criminal cases, discussing the underlying rationales for the Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury and describing modern jury selection procedures. Part II
explains the conflict between the rationales and the procedures that grant symmetri-
cal authority between the prosecution and the defendant. Part III proposes two
possible revised procedures that better reflect the purpose of the Sixth Amendment
by granting the defendant greater control over jury selection.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE JURY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
There are two primary justifications for trial by jury in the United States. First, the
jury trial allows the community to participate in the criminal justice system as part
of democracy.21 Second, it protects criminal defendants from government overreach
by giving them a screen of community members to check the government’s power.22
A. Historical Rationales for a Jury Trial
A discussion of the Founders’ views on the importance of the jury is necessary
to understand the rationales underlying the Sixth Amendment. Briefly stated, before
America’s founding, British courts and colonial courts operated differently, even
though both judicial systems had jury trials.23 In Britain, judges took an inquisitorial
19 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (“Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury
of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
21 See DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 32 (2016).
22 See id.; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (describing the jury’s
purpose to prevent arbitrary exercise of government power in the criminal justice system).
23 See Jon P. McClanahan, The ‘True’ Right to Trial by Jury: The Founders’ Formulation
and Its Demise, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 791, 799 (2009) (explaining the divergence in the amount
of power judges had over juries in Colonial America compared to Britain).
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role and held considerably more power than juries.24 British judges would exercise
their authority over the jurors by compelling juries to reconsider their verdicts when
the outcome diverged from the result that the judge would have reached.25 By the
seventeenth century, though, Bushell’s Case26 forbade judges from retaliating against
jurors through imprisonment for rendering verdicts with which the judge disagreed.27
By contrast, colonial judges played a much less active role in trials and had very
little control over the jury.28 Colonial juries used this power to refuse to render
verdicts that were favorable to Britain.29 Britain attempted to limit the power en-
joyed by colonial juries by restricting the types of cases that were eligible for jury
trial and by giving Britain jurisdiction over certain cases.30 However, these efforts
backfired by increasing hostility between Britain and the Colonies and may have
advanced the American Revolution.31
Perhaps the U.S. Constitution’s most notable feature is its brevity.32 Each word,
phrase, and provision serves a purpose and provides insight into the Founders’
intent. In drafting the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,33 the Founders sought to
24 Id. at 797 (“In the British courts, judicial control over the proceeding and the jury was ini-
tially quite strong, with the judge taking an inquisitorial role in questioning the witnesses . . . .”).
25 Id. at 797–98 (explaining that judges in Britain employed direct and indirect methods
of compelling jurors to reconsider their decisions, and that these methods were coercive).
26 Bushell’s Case (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006.
27 Id. at 1013.
28 See, e.g., Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV.
582, 591 (1939) (“The judges in Rhode Island held office ‘not for the purpose of deciding
causes, for the jury decided all questions of law and fact; but merely to preserve order, and
see that the parties had a fair chance with the jury.’” (citation omitted)).
29 See McClanahan, supra note 23, at 803 (“Thus, juries in colonial America had even
more power than their British counterparts to render verdicts in accordance with their own
views of the law. Colonial jurists sometimes used this power to rebel against oppressive
British control . . . .”).
30 Id. at 802–03.
31 Id. at 803 (“British attempts to curtail [juries’] power only heightened the already
considerable tension between themselves and the colonists, and it ultimately played a part
in the American revolution.”); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S.
1776) (citing “depriv[ation] . . . of the benefits of trial by jury” as a reason for declaring inde-
pendence from England).
32 See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1653 (2014) (“From a comparative perspective, the US Constitution
is among the shortest in the world. . . . The average constitution comprises 21,960 words,
which is about three times as many as the US Constitution contains.”).
33 Thomas Jefferson objected to the original drafting of the Constitution for failing to in-
clude a bill of rights. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Sept. 9,
1792), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 459, 463 (“[M]y objection
to the Constitution was, that it wanted a bill of rights securing freedom of religion, freedom
of the press, freedom from standing armies, [and] trial by jury . . . . The sense of America has
approved my objection and added the bill of rights . . . .”); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
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limit the government’s power through checks and balances among the branches and
between the community and the government.34 By enshrining the right to a jury trial
into the Constitution,35 the Founders demonstrated that they “staunchly believed that
juries played an essential role in the success of a democracy, by protecting against
governmental overreaching, by enabling citizens to participate in the democratic
process, and by operating as a central figure in the administration of justice.”36
The Founders believed that juries should be entitled to serve these functions by
applying their commonsense judgment in rendering verdicts; for example, John Adams
wrote in 1771, “It is not only [the juror’s] right, but his duty . . . to find the verdict
according to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct
opposition to the direction of the court.”37 Likewise, Thomas Jefferson praised the
trial by jury as “the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can
be held to the principles of its constitution.”38 Thus, the jury advanced two principle
objectives of the Founders: (1) checking government powers, and (2) promoting
community participation in governmental functions.39 The inclusion of the word
“public” in the Sixth Amendment40 also reinforces that the Founders intended the
U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (“Objections to the Constitution because of the absence of a bill of rights
were met by the immediate submission and adoption of the Bill of Rights. Included was the
Sixth Amendment . . . .”). Thus, the Bill of Rights was drafted to supplement the Constitution
in response to objections to the originally drafted Constitution for not including an enumeration
of rights. See id. The Sixth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights to guarantee that a
criminal defendant would have a right to a jury. See id.
34 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1260–61 (1996); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 640–42 (1996).
35 Article III of the Constitution also provides for a jury trial in criminal cases: “The Trial
of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 3. However, this provision is not understood as granting a right upon the people, so
the Founders found this jury provision insufficient and refused to ratify the Constitution until
the right to a jury was provided for in a bill of rights. See supra note 33; see also Suja A.
Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise
of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1195, 1199 (2014) (“Many were concerned about this omission and the Supreme Court’s
retention of appellate jurisdiction over law and fact in Article III, so ratification was delayed.
Ultimately the Constitution was enacted based on a promise of a Bill of Rights with additional
jury protections.” (footnotes omitted)).
36 McClanahan, supra note 23, at 803.
37 John Adams, Diary, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 252, 255 (Charles C. Little &
James Brown eds., 1850).
38 Jefferson Letter to Thomas Paine, supra note 1, at 71.
39 See HALE, supra note 21, at 32 (“The jury would both check governmental power and
allow the people to participate in government; in this way, the people would be able to learn
the principles of a republican political order.”).
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
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jury trial to serve as a check on the government.41 By making criminal trials public,
the government would be less able to strong-arm defendants and juries in the way
that British judges did.42
The Supreme Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana,43 relied on the history of the Sixth
Amendment to find that the accused’s right to a jury trial is fundamental and, thus,
applicable to the states.44 In so holding, it enumerated several rationales in support
of the jury trial.45 According to the Duncan Court, the principal justifications for
trial by jury include protecting the defendant from unfounded charges; judges who
are insufficiently independent from the prosecution; arbitrary judicial actions;
overzealous prosecution; compliant, biased, or eccentric judges; and enforcement
of harsh laws.46 Each of these justifications supports the first of the Founders’ two
objectives: checking government powers.47 Further, the jury trial has been so uni-
versally embraced as a means of defending individual liberties against government
intrusion that every state has guaranteed criminal defendants the right to a jury trial
through their respective state constitutions.48
41 See Thomas, supra note 35, at 1203 (“The public nature of the criminal jury trial con-
tributed to the role of the jury as a check on government. People could observe the government
in action in court.”).
42 See HALE, supra note 21, at 32; Thomas, supra note 35, at 1203.
43 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
44 See id. at 155–58.
45 See id.
46 Specifically, Justice White penned:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew
from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against
unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against
judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of
the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted
upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused
with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the
common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less
sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond
this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power,
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 155–56 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
47 See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
48 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 153 (“The constitutions adopted by the original States guaranteed
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B. Modern Jury Selection Procedures
The phrase “jury selection” might be a misnomer, because “selection” suggests
affirmatively choosing good jurors. Instead, jury selection is designed to exclude
problematic jurors.49 For this reason, the jury selection process has been analogized
to weeding a garden.50 Jury selection procedures vary by jurisdiction, but this weeding
generally occurs in three stages.51 First, the jury pool is drawn from the community
at large.52 Second, the judge—or, less often, the parties—conducts voir dire to detect
bias.53 Third, the parties exercise their for-cause and peremptory challenges.54 For-
cause challenges usually occur during voir dire, and peremptory challenges immedi-
ately follow voir dire.55 The petit jury is composed of the remaining jurors, who are
empaneled by taking an oath56 to do justice in accordance with the law.57 This Part
jury trial. Also, the constitution of every State entering the Union thereafter in one form or
another protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases.”).
49 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both
Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 703, 706 (1998) (“Juries are chosen through a process of negative selection intended to
eliminate partial individuals.”).
50 See Marvin Zalman & Olga Tsoudis, Plucking Weeds from the Garden: Lawyers Speak
About Voir Dire, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 166 (2005) (citation omitted).
51 See Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily
Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 377 (2010).
52 See id. at 166 & n.41; Jefferson Edward Howeth, Note, Holland v. Illinois: The Supreme
Court Narrows the Scope of Protection Against Discriminatory Jury Selection Procedures,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 579, 580 & n.13 (1991); cf. Adams & Lane, supra note 49, at 715
(stating that jury selection proceeds in two stages, but that the potential jury pool is comprised
of eligible members of the community).
53 See Lauren R. Deitrich, Note, Transgender and the Judiciary: An Argument to Extend
Batson Challenges to Transgender Individuals, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 719, 724–25 (2016);
Howard, supra note 51, at 378; Howeth, supra note 52, at 580–81.
54 See Deitrich, supra note 53, at 724–25; Howard, supra note 51, at 377, 379, 380–81;
Howeth, supra note 52, at 580–81.
55 See Deitrich, supra note 53, at 724–25; Howard, supra note 51, at 377–81; Howeth,
supra note 52, at 580–81.
56 The juror oath has never been required through any means of codification or procedure,
but some scholars argue that it is an implicit constitutional requirement. As a practical matter,
the juror oath is a long-standing tradition. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Knudsen, The Juror’s Sacred
Oath: Is There a Constitutional Right to a Properly Sworn Jury?, 32 TOURO L. REV. 489,
490–91 (2016) (“[T]he trial procedure of swearing the jury, with its long judicial tradition and
explicit functional significance for constitutional rights, is an implied constitutional require-
ment.” (footnote omitted)); see also Howard, supra note 51, at 377.
57 See Robin Reed, Jury Simulation: The Impact of Judge’s Instructions and Attorney Tactics
on Decisionmaking, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 68 (1980) (“After jury selection has
taken place, jurors take an oath. In this oath they promise to do two things: 1) to decide the
case solely on the facts as developed from the evidence and 2) to uphold the law as it is given
to them by the court.”).
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discusses each step, devoting particular attention to the third step, because peremp-
tory challenges stir the most constitutional controversy.58
The venire is sometimes referred to as the “jury panel” or “jury pool.”59 The
venire must be drawn from a fair cross section of the community.60 Because the petit
jury will only consist of twelve people, applying the fair cross-section requirement to
the empaneled jury is impractical.61 Satisfying the fair cross-section requirement has
proven challenging for courts, because they must choose sources from which to draw
the names of prospective jurors without systematically excluding jurors on the basis
of belonging to an economic, social, religious, racial, political, or geographic group.62
Traditionally, voter registration lists were used to identify eligible citizens in the
jurisdiction.63 However, using voter lists to compile names of potential jurors led to
an underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities.64 In response to this problem,
Congress imposed upon federal courts a multiple source requirement through the
enactment of the Jury Selection and Service Act, under which courts must utilize a
source of names other than voter lists.65 From compiled lists, the court mails a
58 See, e.g., Howeth, supra note 52, at 581 & n.17.
59 See Joshua S. Press, Untruthful Jurors in the Federal Courts: Have We Become Com-
fortably Numb?, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 253, 256 (2009); Howeth, supra note 52, at 580.
60 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (“It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in
Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the
court convenes.”); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (“[T]he American concept
of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.”).
61 See Mitchell S. Zuklie, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CALIF. L.
REV. 101, 102 (1996) (“Given their limited size, juries cannot fully replicate the diversity of the
communities from which they are drawn.”).
62 See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The American tradition of trial by
jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contem-
plates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. . . . [P]rospective
jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any
[economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographic] groups.” (internal citation omit-
ted)); cf. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why the Definition
of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV.
761 (2011).
63 Cf. Zuklie, supra note 61, at 104. The Jury Selection and Service Act, which Congress
passed in 1968, permits federal courts to select potential jurors from voter lists. Id. at 102, 104.
64 Id. at 104–05 (“[V]oter lists typically underrepresent racial and ethnic minorities and
low-income persons.”).
65 See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2012) (stating that each district court must “prescribe
some other source or sources of names in addition to voter lists where necessary to foster the
policy and protect the rights [against discrimination] secured by sections 1861 and 1862 of
this title”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012) (“No citizen shall be excluded from service as
a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in the Court of International
Trade on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.”); Zuklie,
supra note 61, at 102, 104–05.
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questionnaire to prospective jurors designed to determine their eligibility to serve.66
After those questionnaires are returned, the court issues summonses for jury service.67
Voir dire68 is the process by which the venire is narrowed. Traditionally, attorneys
actively participated in voir dire.69 Skepticism arose among scholars who advocated
for jury reform, because attorneys abused voir dire to create a biased jury in their
favor.70 In the modern process, the judge will typically ask the venirepersons questions
intended to detect bias or prejudice.71 Sometimes bias is actual,72 such as when a
prospective juror expressly indicates that he or she would be unable to remain
neutral in a particular type of case.73 Other times, bias is implied, such as when there
is a foundation in law to presume the juror is partial, despite any contrary assur-
ances.74 Because the Sixth Amendment qualifies the defendant’s right to a jury with
66 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a) (2012) (describing the procedure for randomly drawing names and
sending juror qualification forms).
67 See Zuklie, supra note 61, at 105–06 (explaining that, based on the responses from the
questionnaires, the court creates a list of qualified jurors and then “selects a list of prospective
jurors to summon to the courthouse”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(4) (describing the me-
chanics of the “master jury wheel” from which names of eligible jurors are randomly drawn);
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5)–(6) (permitting persons with certain occupations to be excused from
jury service); 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a) (describing the process for selection of jurors from the
master jury wheel); 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (2012) (enumerating grounds for disqualification,
including citizenship, age, linguistic, and capacity requirements); 28 U.S.C. § 1866(b) (2012)
(describing service requirements for summonses).
68 “Voir dire,” translated from French, means “to speak the truth” or “to see them talk.”
See David Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science
Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 245 (1981).
69 See HALE, supra note 21, at 314.
70 See id. (“For many twentieth-century jury reformers, this was a problem: attorneys had
too much control over voir dire (especially in state courts), allowing them to plant certain
biases rather than uncover them.”).
71 See Pam Frasher, Note, Fulfilling Batson and Its Progeny: A Proposed Amendment to
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Attain a More Race- and Gender-
Neutral Jury Selection Process, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1327, 1348 (1995).
72 See Bias, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) (“Actual bias consists in the
existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror which satisfies the court, in the exercise of
a sound discretion, that the juror cannot try the issues impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging.”); see also Howard, supra note 51, at 380 & n.55.
73 See Dru Stevenson, Jury Selection and the Coase Theorem, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1645, 1663
(2012) (“‘For cause’ strikes must be based either on a statutory exclusion of the juror . . . or
based on actual bias, as demonstrated during voir dire; or ‘implied bias,’ a legal presumption
covering relatives and other close associates of the parties themselves.” (footnotes omitted));
see also Howard, supra note 51, at 380 & n.55. For a discussion on venirepersons attempting
to avoid jury duty, see ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL
INJUSTICE 91 (2015) (“Given the great human longing for power—our dry-throated thirst for
control, our teeth-baring fury to protect even the feeblest charge over the most limited domain—I
have always been baffled by the effort people devote to getting out of jury service.”).
74 See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 134 (1936) (“[I]mplied bias [is] a bias
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the word “impartial,” the judge may excuse a biased prospective juror, even if that
juror and the defendant both strenuously object to the exclusion.
Voir dire practices vary across jurisdictions.75 In federal courts, the judge
usually conducts the examination,76 but will allow attorneys to submit additional
questions that the judge may ask.77 In state courts, the attorneys often participate
more actively in voir dire.78 During voir dire, the prosecutor and defense attorney
may move to strike a prospective juror for cause.79 If the judge detects actual or
implied bias and believes that a prospective juror will be unable to faithfully honor
his or her oath to consider only the evidence presented during the trial, then the juror
will be dismissed.80 Because the judge may be satisfied by a prospective juror’s
assurances that he or she can and will remain impartial, for-cause challenges “are
sustained rather infrequently.”81
At the conclusion of voir dire, attorneys for both sides are afforded the opportu-
nity to exercise a statutorily limited number of peremptory challenges.82 A peremp-
tory challenge allows the attorneys to strike a prospective juror without articulating
attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless of actual partiality.”); Stevenson, supra
note 73, at 1663 (“‘For cause’ strikes must be based either on a statutory exclusion of the
juror, . . . or based on actual bias, as demonstrated during voir dire; or ‘implied bias,’ a legal
presumption covering relatives and other close associates of the parties themselves.” (foot-
notes omitted)).
75 See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) (“No hard-and-fast formula dic-
tates the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire.”); BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN & EDIE GREENE,
THE JURY UNDER FIRE: MYTH, CONTROVERSY, AND REFORM 38 (2017) (“Procedural rules in
almost all jurisdictions allow for prospective jurors to be questioned by judges, attorneys, or
both, though practices vary significantly between federal and state courts.”).
76 BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 75, at 38 (“In federal courts voir dire is dominated
by judges, whereas attorneys take a much more active role in state courts.” (internal citation
omitted)).
77 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for jury examination to be conducted by
either the judge or the attorneys, but if the judge conducts voir dire, the attorneys must be al-
lowed either to ask additional questions to the jurors or to submit questions to the jurors. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1) (“The court may examine prospective jurors or may permit the attor-
neys for the parties to do so.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(2) (“If the court examines the jurors, it
must permit the attorneys for the parties to: (A) ask further questions that the court considers
proper; or (B) submit further questions that the court may ask if it considers them proper.”).
78 See BORNSTEIN & GREENE, supra note 75, at 38.
79 See id. (“As the questioning unfolds, a prospective juror may be challenged and elimi-
nated for cause. A for-cause challenge arises when jurors’ views or experiences prevent or
impair them from performing their duties in accordance with the law and their oath to consider
the evidence fairly and impartially.”).
80 See id. at 38–39.
81 Id. at 39.
82 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (setting the number of peremptory challenges each side may
exercise in federal courts); see also Howard, supra note 51, at 377–80; Howeth, supra note
52, at 580–81.
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a reason.83 Peremptory challenges enable attorneys to strategically exclude jurors
based on mere hunches.84 Historically, peremptory challenges were often used
discriminatorily, which led the Supreme Court to prohibit such use of peremptory
challenges; in Batson v. Kentucky,85 the Court applied an Equal Protection analysis86
to prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis
of race when the defendant was of the same race.87 Because the defendant was
required to be of the same race as the excluded juror, the Court was especially
concerned with the Equal Protection of the criminal defendant’s rights.88 Batson’s
progeny have expanded the prohibition of discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges to cases where the defendant and juror are different races,89 suggesting that
the focus has shifted from the Equal Protection and express Sixth Amendment rights
of the defendant to the Equal Protection and implicit Sixth Amendment rights of the
prospective jurors.90 The same-race requirement ensured that the prosecutor would
not exercise peremptory challenges to disadvantage a particular defendant.91 Elimi-
nating that requirement emphasizes the right of members of the community to serve
on a jury and detracts attention from the criminal defendant’s right to a jury.
Although protecting the rights of prospective jurors is constitutionally impor-
tant, it must not come at the expense of the constitutional rights of the criminal
defendant. The constitutional rights of prospective jurors to serve on a jury are
83 See Howard, supra note 51, at 380–81.
84 See id.
85 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
86 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
87 Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 (“The defendant initially must show that he is a member of a
racial group capable of being singled out for differential treatment.”).
88 Id. at 86 (“Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s
right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended
to secure.”). But see id. at 87 (“The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond
that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.”).
89 See generally Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). Batson’s progeny have also ex-
panded the groups of persons who may not be excluded for discriminatory purposes. See
generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting the use of peremptory
challenges on the basis of sex); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that defen-
dants may not use peremptory challenges discriminatorily in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause); United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that prospective
jurors may not be dismissed solely based on their membership in an organization).
90 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 409 (“An individual juror does not have a right to sit on any
particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on
account of race.”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 454 (1996) (“As a matter
of constitutional law, then, McCollum represents a shift from Batson’s primary focus on the
right of a defendant to a fair trial to an exclusive focus on the venirepersons’ right to racially-
neutral jury selection procedures.”).
91 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85, 89–93.
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secondary to the constitutional right of the defendant to an impartial jury.92 The
defendant in a criminal trial faces a loss of liberty or, in capital cases, life. By con-
trast, the prospective juror faces denial of participation on a jury, a right that is
merely implied in the Sixth Amendment, and one that he or she likely views as an
undesirable duty.
In assessing the constitutionality of jury composition, analysis should be
anchored by consideration of the accused’s Sixth Amendment rights. The most con-
stitutionally significant problem with jury selection procedure in criminal cases is
that the prosecution should not be entitled to participate in composing the very jury
that is supposed to serve as a check against its power.93
II. CONFLICT BETWEEN JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES AND
RATIONALES FOR JURY TRIAL
The jury selection process provides both the defendant and the prosecution with
unlimited for-cause challenges to eliminate biased jurors and a fixed number of
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors for any reason or no reason, so
long as the peremptory challenges are not used in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.94 This Part will argue that the language of the Constitution and the rationales
supporting the jury trial demonstrate that current jury selection processes are
unnecessary and irrational. Worse, the symmetry between the prosecution and
defendant in selection procedures undermines the spirit and intent behind this
constitutional right.
Turning first to the language of the Constitution, the Sixth Amendment provides
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury.”95 The key terms in this clause are “accused” and
“impartial.” The term “accused” indicates that the right belongs exclusively to the
defendant and not to the state. The Court has emphasized this language in another
Sixth Amendment context; in Faretta v. California,96 the Court discussed the right
to self-representation and reasoned that “[t]he right to defend is given directly to the
accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”97 In the jury
92 As the Court noted in Faretta v. California, it is the defendant who bears the loss if his
or her Sixth Amendment rights are forgone. 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975) (“The Sixth
Amendment . . . grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. . . . The right
to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the
defense fails.”).
93 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (“The jury acts as a vital check against the wrongful
exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors.”).
94 See Howard, supra note 51, at 379–81, 379 n.51.
95 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
96 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
97 Id. at 819–20.
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context, the right to a jury is given directly to the accused through the same lan-
guage in the Sixth Amendment that gives the right to counsel directly to the
accused.98 The defendant’s interest in jury selection is an interest in being judged by
members of his community and having those community members check the govern-
ment’s power.99 Likewise, it is the accused who suffers the consequences if the state
excessively participates in selecting the accused’s jury.
A historical analysis of peremptory challenges in jury selection also supports the
views that the right to a jury trial exists to benefit the defendant and that the defendant
has a greater interest than the state in the composition of the jury. The privilege to use
peremptory challenges was granted exclusively to the defendant until the mid- to
late 1800s.100 From British common law101 until 1865, the peremptory challenge was
designed and perceived “primarily as a defendant’s weapon.”102 William Blackstone
praised the peremptory challenge as “a provision full of that tenderness and humanity
to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous.”103 In his vigorous dis-
sent in Swain v. Alabama,104 Justice Goldberg wrote, “To begin with, the peremptory
challenge has long been recognized primarily as a device to protect defendants.”105
Thus, the Faretta Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment language and the
98 The language of the Sixth Amendment lists rights belonging to the accused, including the
right to an impartial jury and the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. The dissent in Faretta argued that the Sixth Amendment’s grant of the right
to assistance of counsel did not necessarily give the defendant the right to self-represent, but
the dissent does not argue against the notion that the language of the Sixth Amendment grants
a positive right to the accused. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836–37 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In
the jury context, the right to a jury trial is unambiguously conferred to the accused in the
Sixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Because of the explicitness of the accused’s
right to a jury trial, the reasoning in the dissent in Faretta does not apply to the jury context.
99 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“If the defendant preferred
the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic re-
action of the single judge, he was to have it.”); see also, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1975).
100 See Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of
the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1171–72 (1966) (“[States] were slow to accord the
peremptory challenge to the prosecution, and this was accomplished by statute only over
strenuous constitutional objections. Congress did not abrogate the rule of conformity and
grant the peremptory challenge to the federal prosecutor until 1865.” (footnotes omitted)).
101 Prior to 1305, the Crown had unlimited peremptory challenges, but in 1305, the right
to peremptory challenges was removed entirely. See id. at 1171.
102 Id. at 1172.
103 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353 (emphasizing the protection peremp-
tory challenges afford to the criminal defendant).
104 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that a defendant must show a pattern of discrimination to
prove an equal protection violation when the state systematically excluded African Americans
from a jury).
105 Id. at 242 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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history of peremptory challenges indicate that the jury and its selection are for the
enjoyment and protection of the defendant.
Turning back to the literal text of the Sixth Amendment, one could argue that
the state’s interest in jury selection is to ensure that the jury is not biased. Certainly,
the word “impartial” operates as a limitation on the defendant’s right to a jury. A de-
fendant would naturally prefer a partial jury in his favor to either an impartial jury or
a jury biased in favor of the state. The prosecution’s responsibility, as a seeker of
justice,106 is to act as a check against the defendant’s possible attempts to imbalance
the jury.107 Regardless, to achieve this constitutional interest in impartiality, the prosecu-
tion need not participate in eliminating prospective jurors at the outset of the jury
selection process. Instead, impartiality may be achieved through a later evaluation
that ensures the defendant has not abused his Sixth Amendment right to a jury by
creating a biased jury. Additionally, the prosecutor, in his role as an advocate for the
“State” or the “People,” may protect the Equal Protection rights of prospective jurors
by asserting Batson challenges against the defendant when appropriate.108 The prosecu-
tor’s interest in the jury trial is more limited than the defendant’s right to a jury trial,
so the prosecutor’s participation in selecting the jury should be more limited as well.
Next, the Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana,109 held that the right to a jury in a
criminal trial is a fundamental right.110 In so holding, the Court summarized the
importance of the jury trial throughout U.S. history.111 Most significantly, the Court
offered the aforementioned rationales in support of the trial by jury, centered on
limiting the amount of control the government has in the outcome of the case by
allowing the community to democratically participate in the enforcement of criminal
laws to the benefit of the defendant.112
106 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2015) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds
of the law, not merely to convict.”); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011)
(“The role of a prosecutor is to see that justice is done.”); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”).
107 Cf. Connick, 563 U.S. at 71; Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
108 See generally Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231 (2005); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam); Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42 (1992); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
109 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
110 See id. at 154–56.
111 See id. at 151–56. It was, in part, this history that led to the Court’s holding. See id. at
153 (“Even such skeletal history is impressive support for considering the right to jury trial
in criminal cases to be fundamental to our system of justice . . . .”).
112 See id. at 156.
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Allowing the prosecution to share equal control over jury selection with the
defendant is inconsistent with the goals identified by the Court in Duncan, espe-
cially when peremptory challenges permit the prosecution to make strategic deci-
sions to exclude jurors who are merely sympathetic,113 rather than partial, toward the
defendant, or who are opposed to enforcing certain laws.114 Because, as the Court
explains, the underlying rationale in support of a criminal trial by jury is to allow for
community participation to protect the defendant from oppression by the govern-
ment, the government’s involvement in selecting which members of the community
will protect the defendant against the government’s own authority should be mini-
mal.115 Simply, the state should not be permitted to actively participate in selecting
the very jury that is intended to serve as a check against its power.
Interestingly, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also recognize that de-
fendants ought to have more control than the prosecution in jury selection. Rule
24(b) sets the number of peremptory challenges granted to each side.116 For felony
cases, the prosecution is entitled to six peremptory challenges, and the defendant
may exercise ten.117 Although the history of this Rule at the time it was originally
enacted is unavailable, the Supreme Court attempted to revise the Rule in 1976 to
reduce the number of peremptory challenges to five for each side.118 Congress
rejected the proposed amendment, finding that the Court’s reasons for the proposal
did not “justify giving the prosecution and defense the same number of peremptory
challenges in felony cases.”119 Specifically, Congress was not persuaded by the
Court’s arguments that reducing and equalizing the number of peremptory chal-
lenges would eliminate bias and reduce the systematic exclusion of protected groups
of people.120 Thus, Congress concluded, “it can be questioned whether it is desirable
to introduce a [symmetry] notion into jury selection procedures.”121 By rejecting the
proposed amendment, Congress acknowledged the defendant’s greater entitlement
to control over jury selection.
113 Duncan indicates that sympathy may rightly motivate a defendant to opt for a jury trial
over a bench trial. Id. Because sympathy is a valid reason for asserting one’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial, the prosecution should not be entitled to undermine that right.
114 For a brief explanation of jury nullification, see 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 681 (2017).
115 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
116 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (allotting an equal number of peremptory challenges to the
state and defendant in misdemeanor and capital cases, but granting more peremptory chal-
lenges to the defendant in felony cases).
117 FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2).
118 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 379 & n.14.
119 H.R. REP. NO. 95-195, at 7–8 (1977).
120 Id. (explaining that the difficulty of striking jurors for cause is the underlying reason for
biased jurors and that judge-conducted voir dire is the root of the problem, and further ex-
plaining that prosecutors systematically exclude statistically more jurors than defendants, so
reduction and proportionality are unsupported by the goal of reducing systematic exclusion).
121 Id. at 8.
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In sum, by allowing the prosecution to participate in jury selection equally with
the defendant, jury selection procedures are inconsistent with the historical rationale
for the jury trial, the literal text of the U.S. Constitution, the Court’s interpretation
of the right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions, the Court’s interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment phrase “the accused shall enjoy,”122 and Congress’s rationale for
rejecting a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Given
these examples of the American emphasis on protecting persons from government
overreach, the jury selection process that puts the defendant and the state on equal
footing is plainly untenable.
III. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
Recall that the two primary, underlying justifications for trial by jury are: (1) to
allow community participation in the criminal justice system, and (2) to protect
criminal defendants from government overreach by giving them a screen of commu-
nity members to check the government’s power. Although this Article is concerned
mainly with the second justification, any proposed system must also satisfy the first.
Previous attempts have been made to cure the oft-criticized jury selection
process, but those attempts fail to address the problem of equality between the
defendant and the state during jury selection.123 William Stuntz offers the most
closely related criticism of jury selection.124 He proposes more democratic commu-
nity participation in criminal justice, notes the general demise of the jury trial, and
discusses the ways in which prosecutorial discretion and vague criminal laws add
to uncertainty in criminal liability.125 However, he argues that, although vagueness
in criminal law is “part of a well-functioning system of checks and balances,”126 a
change in jury selection procedure is necessary for the viability of such a system.127
Stuntz’s ultimate proposal for revising the jury selection procedure focuses on the
first step of jury selection: drawing the venire.128
Presently, the venire is selected from the district in which the crime occurred,
usually the county.129 Thus, the jury panel consists of members who represent a
broad community; Stuntz argues that the jury panel should instead be drawn from
122 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
123 See generally, e.g., Frasher, supra note 71.
124 See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(2011).
125 See generally id.
126 Id. at 304 (“Vague criminal prohibitions once were, and might be again, part of a well-
functioning system of checks and balances.”).
127 Id. (“For those checks and balances to work as they should, one more legal change is
needed: a change in the manner in which juries are selected.”).
128 Id.
129 Id.
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a more localized pool.130 The purpose of localizing jury pools is to give a voice to
the community that is most affected by the crime.131 In addition to localizing jury
pools, Stuntz also advocates for fewer peremptory challenges, because the body of
law from Batson and its progeny is costly and ineffective in eliminating discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges.132 He acknowledges that his two proposed
changes—localizing jury pools and limiting peremptory challenges—“might make
convictions harder to obtain.”133 He justifies this pro-defendant result, not by arguing
that the defendant has a right and a greater interest in the jury trial than the state
does, but instead by showing that the criminal justice system is currently “stacked
in the government’s favor.”134 He argues that his proposal would require the prose-
cution to persuade a jury of twelve persons from a high-crime neighborhood to
convict one of their neighbors.135
Although Stuntz’s proposals seemingly reflect the first justification for jury
trials by putting disenfranchised members of the community into the jury box, he
makes an interesting point about the comparative advantage the state has over the
defendant. He hints at the second rationale when he writes that “[c]urrent jury
selection rules facilitate conviction . . . instead of obstructing it.”136 Nevertheless,
although his proposals are aimed to satisfy both rationales, Stuntz does not ade-
quately articulate that the defendant is constitutionally entitled to greater control
over the selection process. This Article proposes two possible remedies that keep the
spirit of both justifications for the jury trial by granting the defendant greater control
than the prosecution over selecting the jury after the panel has been drawn.
The problem of equality between the defendant and prosecution is not presented
in the first step of jury selection. Thus, both of the following proposals leave the
Jury Selection Act procedures for drawing names for the jury panel unchanged, but
are workable under Stuntz’s suggested localized pools as well. With respect to the
second step of jury selection, voir dire, the following proposals both call for judge-
conducted voir dire and allow the defendant, but not the prosecution, to submit
questions to the judge. The judge, as a neutral government actor, would ask prospec-
tive jurors questions designed to detect bias. After the judge and defendant dismiss
jurors for cause, the prosecution then enters into the selection process.
Under the first revised system of jury selection, there are no peremptory challenges.
Instead, the defendant compiles a list of approved jurors from those prospective
130 Id. (“Jury selection in large cities should be neighborhood based . . . .”).
131 See id.
132 Id. (“[T]he number of peremptory challenges should be substantially reduced. . . . [This
reduction] would remove the need for the expensive, elaborate, and largely ineffective body
of law barring the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Eliminating that body of law
would make criminal trials cheaper, a large collateral benefit.” (footnotes omitted)).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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jurors not excluded for cause. This list will include a greater number of jurors than
those who can actually serve. For example, if the empaneled jury will be composed
of twelve jurors and two alternates, the defendant may present a list of twenty jurors.
The prosecution would then inspect the list of proposed jurors and select the twelve
who will actually serve and the two alternates. Because the list from which the
prosecution selects has already been approved by the judge and the defendant, the
prosecution can simply dismiss the six nonserving jurors for any or no reason. This
procedure gives the defendant an active role in selecting his jury, while giving the
prosecution a later-stage role in selection. The judge’s early involvement and the
prosecution’s later-stage role provide ample opportunity to sufficiently prevent
abuse by a defendant. Eliminating the prosecution’s ability to exercise strategic
challenges is consistent with the rationales for the defendant’s right to a jury trial.
This gives the defendant more control than the prosecution without compromising
the state’s interest in ensuring that the jury is impartial. The defendant would pull
the weeds from the garden, and the prosecution would pick the flowers.137
Critics may argue that the defendant could compile the list discriminatorily, ex-
cluding potential jurors on the basis of race or another characteristic protected by the
Equal Protection Clause through Batson and its progeny.138 Although discrimination
would not arise specifically through peremptory challenges, defendants could still
plausibly exclude jurors systematically from the short list on the basis of membership
in a protected class. In its roles as advocate for the State or the People and as seeker
of justice, the prosecution would be entitled to raise Batson challenges to vindicate the
rights of the excluded jurors under the Equal Protection Clause.139 If the prosecution
observes systematic exclusion on the basis of a protected characteristic, then it may
challenge the defendant’s proposed list. Because, under the current system, discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges is more frequently committed by the prosecution,140
this proposed system might make jury selection more efficient by reducing the
frequency of Batson challenges.141
137 See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.
138 See generally Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that the defendant is
prohibited from discriminatory use of peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause).
139 For Batson challenge procedures, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See also
generally Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231
(2005); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam); McCollum, 505 U.S. 42; Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
140 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-195, at 8 (1977) (“The rationale that reducing the number of
peremptories will eliminate the systematic exclusion of certain groups of people is also un-
persuasive. Since the number of defense peremptories was reduced more than the number
of prosecution peremptories [in the proposed amendment that would have given equal
peremptories to the defense and the prosecution], that rationale seems to be bottomed upon
an assumption that it is defense counsel who are using peremptory challenges systematically
to exclude classes of people. The testimony and statistics . . . indicate that, on the contrary,
it is the prosecution that most often uses peremptories in that fashion.”).
141 Batson challenges require the challenging party to make the prima facie case for asserting
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Alternatively, under the second proposal, peremptory challenges are reserved
for the exclusive enjoyment of defendants. The abolition of prosecutorial peremptory
challenges is not a novel idea.142 Asymmetry between the prosecution and defense
at the peremptory stage may help cure the fact that, as Stuntz explains, the criminal
justice system is “stacked in the government’s favor.”143 For example, the fair cross-
section requirement, as part of the right to a jury trial, is intended to protect the
defendant.144 Yet, there is a practical impossibility of achieving a representative
empaneled jury.145 Thus, the fair cross-section requirement only applies to the pool
from which the jurors are actually selected. Even this loosened mandate has been
criticized as “anemic” in its application and enforcement, because some community
members are absent from the lists from which the court draws names.146 The jury
selection scales that should be tipped in favor of the defendant instead weigh more
heavily for the state at this first stage. Giving the defendant heightened control over
jury selection at the peremptory challenge stage would not remedy the ills experi-
enced by members of the community, but it would tip the scales back toward the
defendant’s side by giving the defendant more control over who will ultimately
check the government’s power.
These are only two of several possible ways to grant the defendant more control
over the jury selection process. Any procedural revision giving the defendant more
discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767–68. The burden then shifts to the challenged party
to offer a race-neutral explanation for striking a particular juror. See id. at 767. Some critics
of Batson argue that this procedure is a “charade” or an “ill-conceived sinkhole.” See Minetos
v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that it is time to end the
“charade” that the Batson test genuinely reveals racial discrimination); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 21, 67 (1993) (referring to Batson as an “ill-conceived sinkhole”); Antony Page,
Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 155, 179 (2005).
142 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Dis-
criminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1148 (1994)
(“There is ample historical precedent for the allotment of peremptories to defendants but not
to the government.”).
143 STUNTZ, supra note 124, at 304 (describing procedures as “stacked in the government’s
favor”).
144 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“We accept the fair-cross-section
requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are
convinced that the requirement has solid foundation. The purpose of a jury is to guard against
the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the com-
munity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.”).
145 See Zuklie, supra note 61, at 102 (“Given their limited size, juries cannot fully repli-
cate the diversity of the communities from which they are drawn.”).
146 Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1503, 1528 (2015).
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control would be an improvement over the current structure, because such a revision
would better reflect the Founders’ vision and the Court’s interpretation of the right.
A change in the procedure that affords the defendant greater control than the
prosecution could also resolve other identified Sixth Amendment issues, such as the
prevalence of plea bargaining (i.e., waiver of the right to a jury trial) and the low
rate of jury acquittals.147 If the defendant were able to enjoy his right to an impartial
jury more fully, by having more control in selecting his “hedge”148 against the gov-
ernment, then he might be more willing to assert his right to a jury trial. The petit
jury may also be more likely to acquit if the jurors’ interaction with the prosecution
is limited during the selection process. This ultimately would better reflect the
Founders’ intention for the jury trial to be the rule, rather than the exception.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial has been praised for serving as a vital
protection for the defendant against governmental overreach.149 In practice, however,
defendants waive this right in the overwhelming majority of cases through plea
bargaining. Of the comparatively rare cases that go to trial, those tried before a jury
are more likely to result in a conviction than those tried before a judge.150 An investiga-
tion into the inconsistency between the celebration of the jury trial as a benefit to the
defendant and the grim reality of high conviction rates reveals a constitutional
problem in the process through which juries are selected. The procedures afford the
prosecution symmetrical participation with the defendant in selecting the jury. This
is problematic because the jury trial is meant to serve the defendant by providing a
hedge against the government. The state should not enjoy equal participation with
the defendant in selecting the very jury charged with checking its power. To cure the
problem, it is necessary to revisit jury selection procedures with the purpose behind
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights in mind and to revise those procedures by
granting the defendant greater control over his enjoyment of his right.
147 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
148 See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
149 See id.; see also Jefferson Letter to Thomas Paine, supra note 1, at 71.
150 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
